why run a mail server section
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@ -23,6 +23,35 @@ A mail server is software which can be run on any computer, including yours. You
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already own that is hosting other services, so long as those other services aren't using any of the [mail
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already own that is hosting other services, so long as those other services aren't using any of the [mail
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ports](#unblock-your-ports).
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ports](#unblock-your-ports).
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## Why run my own mail server?
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I'll cut to the chase: the main reason why you'd want to run your own mail server is for related reasons of privacy and
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digital sovereignty. For privacy benefits, as much as you have control over your server, you can protect your email
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from the eyes of prying server admins (given that you yourself are the admin). Even for email providers that market
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themselves around privacy such as Protonmail, rely on trust that Proton are not reading your unencrypted incoming
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email. This is not an issue exclusive to any particular mail provider; if information arrives unencrypted at a server,
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those with access to the server (i.e. administrators) can read that information, simple as. And as nice as it would be
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if everyone used GPG end-to-end encryption for email, the vast majority of emails people receive are not end-to-end
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encrypted, and entirely legible to the mail servers involved. If you're not exchanging <abbr
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title="End-to-End Encrypted">E2EE</abbr> email, you can't mitigate the fact that your exchange is entirely legible to
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the mail server of the person you're corresponding with, but you can at least eliminate your anxieties about the mail
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server you yourself are using.[^server_trust]
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Running your own mail server also allows you to implement things your way, with the features you want. For instance,
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[you can run a sieve filter for encrypting all incoming mail with a user's public GPG
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key](https://www.grepular.com/Automatically_Encrypting_all_Incoming_Email); for obvious reasons, users of externally
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managed mail servers that implement sieve do not allow users to create their own executables for sieve filters.
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Hosting your own mail server is not something I would universally recommend to people. While I'm very much against
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"nothing to hide, nothing to fear", a combination of that factor alongside a low state threat model (i.e. there is
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little state interest in you, domestic or foreign), a lack of relevant knowledge, and a lack of interest in managing
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your own server/learning how to, likely make self-hosting email not a reasonable privacy suggestion.
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When you host your own mail server, you are responsible for securing the server. If you entrust Google with your email,
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you can at least know that your email is secure, though not private; Google will hire people with the relevant
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knowledge and skills to secure a mail server. If you are not confident in your ability to do this and not interested in
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learning, you may want to find another solution.
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# Why this tutorial?
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# Why this tutorial?
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There are many tutorials on the internet about how to set up a mail server. I don't claim that mine is particularly
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There are many tutorials on the internet about how to set up a mail server. I don't claim that mine is particularly
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@ -264,11 +293,38 @@ so ultimately `revsuine` will get `postmaster`'s mail.
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You can continue to populate the aliases file with whatever aliases you want.
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You can continue to populate the aliases file with whatever aliases you want.
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# Dovecot
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[Dovecot](https://www.dovecot.org/) is a popular IMAP and POP3 server which we'll be using for our MDA.
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<!-- FOOTNOTES: -->
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<!-- FOOTNOTES: -->
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[^server_trust]: This is only true to the extent that your server is not compromised. You could say there's an order of
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server trust-ability that goes:
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```
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VPS < rented dedicated server < server you yourself physically own, store, and manage
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```
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There is little that can be done to secure a VM running on a compromised host. Even with full-disk encryption, the
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host can dump the encryption key from RAM, because the encryption key must be stored in memory whilst a
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full-disk-encrypted system is booted.
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For a dedicated server you rent, there are at least no concerns about a compromised host, but an attacker with
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physical access (in this case, the untrusted people you rent the dedicated server from) can attempt evil maid
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attacks. You are hopefully able to implement things to detect this, though.
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There are reasons you may want to go with a rented server instead of one you own, though. For instance, if you live
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in a jurisdiction known for terrible privacy laws such as a [5/14 eyes
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country](https://restoreprivacy.com/5-eyes-9-eyes-14-eyes/), or if you are a political dissident with domestic
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state interest in you, you likely want to go offshore for server hosting. Changing the jurisdiction can protect you
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if the jurisdiction you choose won't work with your national intelligence agencies.
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[^postfix_aliases_location]: Your aliases file will most likely be in this location by default, but you can run
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[^postfix_aliases_location]: Your aliases file will most likely be in this location by default, but you can run
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```
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$ postconf alias_maps
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$ postconf alias_maps
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```
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to find out where this file should be.
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to find out where this file should be.
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